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THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION IN JAPAN: A
MODEL FOR U.S. PATENT LAW?
Jennifer A. Johnson
t
Abstract: The patent laws of the United States and Japan contain provisions that
permit the experimental use of patented inventions. In the United States, the common
law experimental use exception has been utilized to permit the use of a patented invention
to satisfy intellectual curiosity, as long as the use is not commercial. In 1984, the Hatch-
Waxman Act provided a statutory experimental use exception in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
It amended the Patent Act to allow a generic drug company to experiment with a pioneer
drug during the pioneer drug's patent term to generate data for obtaining regulatory
approval. In contrast, § 69(1) of the Japanese Patent Law provides for a general statutory
experimental use exception that allows use of any patented invention for experiment or
research. The general experimental use exception in Japan is much broader than the two
experimental use provisions in the United States and permits more beneficial uses.
The experimental use approaches taken in the United States have been problematic.
To remedy these problems, the United States Congress has proposed several bills, each
with differing breadth, which would protect additional types of experimental use or
modify the Hatch-Waxman Act. No such reform has passed to date. This Comment
argues that the United States may benefit from adopting a general statutory experimental
use exception like Japan's. This Comment further argues that broadening the
experimental use exception in the United States would not decrease the incentives created
by the patent system. Furthermore, since the Japanese approach is more consistent with
the patent systems of other countries, it facilitates patent harmonization better than the
narrow exception provided in the United States.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent Rose Garden press conference, President Bush proposed
regulations to "reduce the cost of prescription drugs in America by billions
of dollars and ease the financial burden for many citizens, especially our
seniors. ' The proposed regulations aim to bring cheaper generic drugs to
the market more quickly by removing legal loopholes that pioneer drug
companies have exploited to artificially extend their patent monopolies.
2
Thus, patent law has moved to the forefront of the U.S. healthcare debate.
" Ph.D. in Plant Biology 2001, University of Califomia, Berkeley; J.D. expected in 2004, University
of Washington School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Toshiko Takenaka and the Pacific
Rim Law and Policy Journal staff for their valuable comments.
' Bush Proposes Rules to Boost Generic Drugs,
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/l0/21/bush.generic.drugs/index.htrl (last visited Jan 28,
2003) [hereinafter Bush Proposes Rules].
2 Id. For the purpose of this Comment "pioneer drug companies" are pharmaceutical companies
that perform extensive research and development to develop new drugs.
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Patents encourage technical progress and protect the investments and
commercial interests of inventors by vesting exclusive rights to the invention
in the patent holder for a limited time.3 In exchange for this exclusive right,
the inventor must publicly disclose the invention.4 However, these rights are
not absolute.5 For example, in instances where strong public policies
outweigh the policies behind granting patent exclusivity, the scope of a
patent may be limited.6
The experimental use exception to infringement, also referred to as a
defense to infringement, 7 is employed in many different circumstances.
Depending on the patent law of the country, an experimental use exception
may cover experiments to verify the truth and sufficiency of a disclosure in a
patent specification;8 experiments conducted to satisfy intellectual curiosity
with no intent of profitin o from the invention;9 experiments conducted in
preparation for licensing; experiments aimed at acquiring data about a
product to satisfy regulatory agencies; 1 and experiments aimed at finding a
new use for a patented invention. ' 2
Both the United States and Japan have provisions that permit
experimental use in their patent laws. A comparison of the experimental use
exceptions in these two countries, however, reveals that the United States
and Japan have taken drastically different approaches. The U.S.
experimental use provisions include a common law experimental use
exception and a pharmaceutical industry-specific provision provided in the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 3 The Hatch-Waxman experimental use provision was
enacted to ensure that generic drug manufacturers could conduct tests with a
patented pioneer drug for regulatory approval of a generic formulation. 14
Japan also allows generic drug manufacturers to experiment with patented
drugs to obtain regulatory approval, but accomplishes this through a general
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (The Constitution gives Congress the power "[to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); David Gilat, Experimental Use and Patents, in 16
STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW 2-3 (1995).
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03 [1] (2002).
6 Gilat, supra note 3, at 17.
7 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 16.03 [1]; Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).





13 See discussion infra Parts II.A & C. This Comment does not discuss experimental use in relation
to thepublic use and on sale bars in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
See discussion infra Part II.C.
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statutory experimental use exception.15  Although both countries allow
experimentation for obtaining regulatory approval, their divergent
approaches to experimental use have resulted in experimental uses being
allowed in Japan that are not allowed in the United States." A comparison
of the U.S. and Japanese experimental use exceptions is especially important
because Europe, Japan and the United States dominate the US $343 billion
pharmaceutical industry. 17
This Comment argues that the U.S. experimental use approach is
problematic and advocates that the United States adopt an experimental use
provision similar to that of Japan. Part II of this Comment describes the
development and current state of the experimental use exception in U.S.
patent law, while Part III addresses the experimental use exception in Japan.
Part IV discusses the criticisms of the U.S. experimental use exceptions,
while Part V considers the experimental use exception in the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and patent harmonization
efforts. Finally, Part VI evaluates prior attempts to bring the United States
closer to the Japanese model and argues that the United States may benefit
from a general statutory experimental use exception.
II. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States there are two types of experimental use
exceptions to patent infringement: the common law experimental use
exception and a statutory experimental use exception. The common law
experimental use exception, developed over one hundred years ago, permits
the use of a patented invention to satisfy intellectual curiosity as long as
there is no commercial purpose. After the Federal Circuit held that a generic
drug manufacturer could not experiment with a pioneer drug to obtain
regulatory approval under the common law experimental use exception,
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act. The act added a narrow statutory
experimental use exception that permits the use of a patented drug for
purposes "reasonably related" to obtaining Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approval. This statutory exception has been interpreted broadly
and many seemingly commercial activities have been found reasonably
15 See discussion infra Part In.
16 See discussion infra Parts IlI.D & IV.
"7 Global Pharma Market Facts, (Helmet Weissner ed.),
at http://www.pharma-outsourcing.com/open/library/globalpharma-market/facts.htm (last visited Jan. 28,
2003).
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related to obtaining regulatory approval. Although the Hatch-Waxman Act
superseded the common law experimental use exception with respect to
inventions that require FDA approval, the common law exception survives
in all other areas.
A. The Common Law Experimental Use Exception (Pre-1984)
First developed by Supreme Court Justice Story in 1813, the common
law experimental use exception is based on the reasoning that "[i]t could
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man who
constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its
described effects."' s Throughout the nineteenth century, the experimental
use exception was continually recognized, and it became well-established
that experiments conducted with a patented invention did not infringe the
patent if they were performed for the sole purpose of satisfying intellectual
curiosity or for mere amusement. 19 The common law developed with the
assumption that these types of experiments did not disturb the rights of the
20patent holder, as long as there was no commercial purpose.
From the mid-nineteenth century until 1983, only a handful of
accused infringers successfully relied on the experimental use defense to
infringement. 21 The exception was premised on the idea that a patentee will
not uncover a de minimis experimental use with no commercial purpose or
spend valuable resources to enforce his patent rights when damages will be
22limited. The common law experimental use exception's limited utility
prevented it from becoming a commonly used defense in patent
infringement actions. 23 In 1984, however, the experimental use exception
" Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (No. 17,600) (C.C.D. Mass. 1813), quoted in Roche
Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
19 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 16.03 [I]; See, e.g., Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (No.
11,279) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861); Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (No 2,262) (C.C.D. Mass. 1852); Sawin
v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (No. 12,391) (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
20 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 16.03 [1].
21 Id.; see, e.g., Dugan v. Lear Avia, 55 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 156 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1946) (finding no infringement when a defendant built the device only experimentally and did not
manufacture or sell it); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305 (N.D.W.Va. 1937) (holding
that the defendant's use of a patented machine was experimental and did not amount to infringement when
there was no intent to profit from the use); and Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. CI.
1958) (holding that the use of a patented metal alloy by the United States was not infringement because the
alloy was used only for testing and experimental purposes).
22 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 16.03 [1] (stating that the "experimental purpose doctrine 'is nothing
more than an expression of the maxim de minimis non curat lex.').23 Id.
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acquired increasing prominence with the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit's landmark decision, Roche v. Bolar.
24
B. Roche v. Bolar: The Common Law Experimental Use Exception at
the Forefront
In Roche v. Bolar, the Federal Circuit found that the common law
experimental use exception did not apply to the "use of a patented drug for
testing and investigation strictly related to [Food and Drug Administration]
drug approval requirements during the last [six] months of the term of the
patent."'2  Roche owned the rights to the active ingredient of a popular
sleeping pill.26 Bolar, interested in manufacturing a generic version, began
testing to generate data for FDA approval prior to the expiration of Roche's
patent.2' Bolar argued that experimenting with the drug prior to patent
expiration should be allowed because FDA approval often takes more than
two years and the success of a generic drug is related to how quickly the
28drug enters the market after the pioneer drug patent expires. The Federal
Circuit reversed the district court's decision that Bolar's use fell under the
experimental use exception and held that Bolar infringed the Roche patent.29
The Federal Circuit reasoned that Bolar's use of the patented drug was
not merely for amusement or philosophical inquiry; rather, the company
intended to use the data to meet the requirements for commercialization of
the generic drug. 30 Therefore, Bolar infringed Roche's patent because its
use was for business purposes and did not fall within the common law
experimental use exception. 3' The court declined to increase the scope of
the exception, describing the common law experimental use exception as
"truly narrow."
32
Bolar also argued the case on policy grounds, stating that the Federal
Circuit should reconcile the conflicting policies and purposes of the Patent
Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").33 The FDCA
sets forth the requirements for obtaining FDA approval, which include
24 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
25 Id. at 861.
21 Id. at 860.
27 id.
28 id.
29 Id. at 861.
30 Id. at 863.
31 Id. at 860, 865.
32 Id. at 863.
33 Id.
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proving the safety and efficacy of a new drug.34 At the time of Roche, it
routinely took seven to ten years to comply with these regulatory
requirements. 35 Because drug patents are generally issued prior to FDA
testing, the time that a pioneer drug was on the market before the patent term
expired under the Patent Act of 1952 was often significantly less that the full
patent term of seventeen years at that time.36 Some of the patent term was
"restored," however, as generic drug companies were prohibited from
generating data required to satisfy FDA requirements until after the original
drug patent expired.37 This effectively added the time needed to obtain data
and regulatory approval of the generic drug to the pioneer drug's patent
term.38 The Federal Circuit, by denying that such testing fell within the
common law experimental use exception, refused to address this conflict and
invited Congress to consider the issue.39
C. The Hatch- Waxman Act: Congress'Response
Congress resolved the conflict between the FDCA and the Patent Act
by enacting the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.40  The Hatch-Waxman Act
negated the Federal Circuit's decision in Roche v. Bolar by providing that
the use of a patented drug for the generation of data required for regulatory
approval is not an infringing use. The Hatch-Waxman Act added
§ 271 (e)(1) of the Patent Act to provide that:
[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under
a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs .... 41
34 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000).




39 Id. at 865.
40 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, P.L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified as amended at Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); Patent Act,
35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2000)) [hereinafter the Hatch-Waxman Act].
" 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) (2000).
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In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act extended a pioneer drug's patent term
for up to five years,42 to restore the patent term that was effectively lost
while the pioneer drug was obtaining regulatory approval.43
The Hatch-Waxman Act also amended the FDCA to establish new,
abbreviated requirements for generic drug FDA approval. 4 Unlike approval
for pioneer drugs, generic drug approval does not require that the generic
drug is proven safe and effective.45 Rather, the generic drug manufacturer
has to prove only that the generic drug is a bioequivalent of the pioneer drug,
that the generic drug has the same active ingredients as the pioneer drug, and
that the route of administration, dosage, and strength of the generic drug is
the same as the pioneer drug.46  This abbreviated procedure, called an
Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"), aims to decrease the time
and experimentation required for a generic drug to gain approval. 7 The act
also requires that when a generic drug manufacturer files with the FDA it
must certify that either: (1) there is no patent on the pioneer drug; (2) there
is a patent on the pioneer drug, but that the patent has expired; (3) there is a
patent on the pioneer drug, but that the patent will expire on a specified date;
or (4) the patent on the pioneer drug is invalid or not infringed by the generic
drug manufacturer.48
This certification process determines when the generic drug company
may begin commercial production of the generic drug. FDA approval is
effective immediately if the generic manufacturer states that there is no
patent on the pioneer drug or that the patent has expired.49 If the generic
drug manufacturer certifies that the pioneer drug's patent will expire on a
certain date, approval is effective as soon as the pioneer drug patent has
expired.50 If the generic drug manufacturer certifies that the pioneer drug
patent is invalid or not infringed, the generic drug is approved only after the
generic drug manufacturer notifies the pioneer drug manufacturer that the
generic drug manufacturer has filed an application for FDA approval, and
has certified that the pioneer drug patent is either invalid or not infringed.5 1
This type of certification is frequently referred to as a Paragraph IV ANDA
42 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. I, at 18 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2651.
44 Id. at 1.
4 Id. at 16.
46 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii-iv) (2000).
4' H.R. REP. NO. 98-857 at 18.
" 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
41 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
sO Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
s' Id. § 355()(5)(B)(iii).
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filing. 52 The generic drug application is approved only if the pioneer drug
manufacturer has not commenced a lawsuit for infringement within forty-
five days after receiving notice.53 If the patent holder does file suit, approval
is suspended until: (1) a court finds that the patent is invalid or not infringed;
(2) the patent expires; or (3) thirty months, whichever occurs first.
54
D. Interpreting the Scope of the § 271(e)(1) Experimental Use Exception
Since the Hatch-Waxman Act became law, a significant amount of
litigation has stemmed from the experimental use exception provided in §
271(e)(1). 55 For example, in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, the Supreme
Court defined the scope of the experimental use exception under §
271(e)(1). 56 Eli Lilly, the holder of a patent for a cardiac defibrillator, filed
an infringement action against Medtronic for its use of a similar
defibrillator.57 Medtronic relied on § 271 (e)(1) and denied infringing the Eli
Lilly patent on the grounds that Medtronic's use of the defibrillator was
reasonably related to obtaining data for FDA approval.58 Eli Lilly argued
that § 271(e)(1) applies only to drugs and not to medical devices. 59 The
Court held that all of the products eligible for patent term extension under
the Hatch-Waxman Act fall within the scope of the § 271 (e)(1) experimental
use exception. Thus, medical devices, food additives, color additives, new
drugs, antibiotic drugs, and human biological products may be used during
the original patent term without infringing the original patent, as long as the
use is reasonably related to obtaining data for FDA approval. 61
Consequently, the Court held that Medtronic did not infringe Eli Lilly's
defibrillator patent.62
52 Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 187, 189 (1999).
53 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
14 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I-III).
55 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v.
Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); and Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3620, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1993) (affirmed in an unpublished opinion).
" 496 U.S. 661.
17 Id. at 663.
" Id. at 664.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 674.
62 Id. at 679.
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The District Court for the Northern District of California's decision in
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co., Inc. further interpreted the scope of §
271 (e)(1) by clarifying which activities are "reasonably related" to obtaining
FDA approval and thus within the § 271 (e)(1) experimental use exception.6
The district court interpreted activities "reasonably related" to obtaining
FDA approval broadly, holding that Ventritex's use of an implantable
defibrillator was experimental and did not infringe Intermedic's patent.64
First, the court found that Ventritex's manufacture of several hundred
defibrillators qualified as experimental use under § 271 (e)(1), as most of the
devices were used in tests that generated data for FDA approval.65 Second,
selling the device to U.S. hospitals was also permitted, as there was no
evidence that the device was used outside of clinical testing.66 The court
also allowed Ventritex to sell the defibrillators to hospitals and to continue
generating clinical data even after submission of their application to the
FDA, since the FDA might later require more clinical data.67 Third,
Ventritex's sale of the defibrillators to international distributors was also
deemed reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval, as the devices were
subsequently resold to approved FDA clinical investigators.6 8 Fourth, the
court permitted Ventritex's testing of the device in Germany. 69  It
emphasized that all of the defibrillators sold in Germany were used by
70investigators to generate data for FDA approval only. There was no
evidence that the data was ever submitted to German authorities for approval
in Germany. vl  Finally, demonstration of the defibrillator at various
scientific trade shows was also an experimental use and reasonably related to
getting FDA approval.7 2 The court reasoned that demonstration of the
device, even at a commercial venue, was not an infringing use since the
FDA might eventually require Ventritex to recruit additional investigators.7 3
Therefore, the district court defined "reasonably related" very broadly, and
many seemingly commercial uses fell under the § 271 (e)(1) experimental
" 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. CaL. 1991), af'd, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3620, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22,
1993) (affirmed in an unpublished opinion).
6 Id. at 1280, 1289.
65 Id. at 1282.
66Id.
67 id.
66 Id. at 1283.
69 Id. at 1284.
70 Id.
71 id.
72 Id. at 1287.
73 Id. at 1288.
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use exception. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision in an
unpublished opinion. 4
Although the Federal Circuit's Intermedics v. Ventritex opinion lacks
precedential weight, the Federal Circuit explicitly endorsed the district
court's broad interpretation of § 271 (e)(1) in Telectronic Pacing Systems v.
Ventritex.7 5  In another dispute regarding the use of an implantable
defibrillator, the Federal Circuit found that Ventritex's display of its
defibrillator at seven medical conferences and use of clinical data for
fundraising purposes were "reasonably related" to obtaining FDA approval76
and fell within the scope of the § 271(e)(1) experimental use exception.
The court reasoned that Congress was aware of the need for companies to
raise funds to develop their products and to prepare for entry into the
marketplace once the original patent has expired.77 Since Congress did not
include a provision prohibiting the use of clinical testing data for fundraising
and other business purposes, uses other than those absolutely required for
FDA approval might also be permitted.7 8  "As long as the activity is
reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval, [the accused infringer's]
intent or alternative uses are irrelevant to its qualification to invoke the
section 271(e)(1) shield.,
79
E. The Common Law Experimental Use Exception After the Hatch-
Waxman Act
Although the experimental use exception in § 271(e)(1) has been
interpreted broadly, this exception only relates to experimental uses for
obtaining FDA approval.80 Other experimental uses are not specifically
included in the Hatch-Waxman Act.81  Therefore, it is unclear whether
experimental uses other than those for FDA approval are still protected
under the narrow common law experimental use exception. 2
While the Hatch-Waxman legislative history demonstrates that the act
was a response to the interpretation of the common law experimental use
74 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3620, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 1993).
" Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 n.5 (Fed. Cit. 1992).
76 Id. at 1525.
77 id.
78 Id.
79 Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
go See discussion supra Parts II.C & D.
8' See discussion supra Parts II.C & D.
82 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 16.03 [1]. For a discussion of the common law experimental use
exception, see discussion supra Part II.A.
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exception, it is silent as to whether the common law experimental use
exception survived the Hatch-Waxman Act.83  The common law
experimental use exception in Roche permitted the experimental use defense
to infringement only when the use was for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strict philosophical inquiry. 84 In Roche, the Federal Circuit
continued its narrow interpretation of this exception and found that Bolar's
use of the patented drug for obtaining regulatory approval was not permitted
under the common law exception since its use was commercial. 85 Less than
six months later, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act. 6 Although the
act prevents the application of the common law experimental use exception
to drugs, medical devices and other products covered by § 271 (e)(1), 87 there
has been confusion regarding whether the common law experimental use
exception still applies to other inventions.8
The U.S. Court of Claims, predecessor of the Federal Circuit, stated
that "although [the act] changed that narrow application of the doctrine
affecting reporting requirements for federal drug laws, Congress did not
disturb the Federal Circuit's enunciation of the parameters of the
experimental use exception." 89  Ten years later, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged the precedential value of the Court of Claims' decision and
recognized the common law experimental use exception. 90 Even as recently
as October 2002, the Federal Circuit again recognized the judicially created
common law experimental use exception, albeit in its very limited form. 9 1
In contrast, the District Court for the Northern District of California
implied that the common law experimental use exception no longer exists,
stating "Congress enacted § 271(e)(1) in 1984 in order to reverse the opinion
of the [Federal Circuit] in [Roche v. Bolar]. 92  Because the legislative
history of the Hatch-Waxman Act does not show congressional intent to
preempt the common law experimental use exception,93 and since the U.S.
" Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1, 26 (2001).
84 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858. 862-63 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see
supra Part i1.
"s 733 F.2d at 861.
86 Gilat, supra note 3, at 5.
87 Mueller, supra note 83, at 27.
88 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 16.03 [1].
89 Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 CI. Ct. 624, 632 n.14 (Cl. Ct. 1990).
90 Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).91 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reaffirming the validity of the
experimental use exception in a very limited form).92 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
93 Mueller, supra note 83, at 26.
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Court of Claims and the Federal Circuit have endorsed a narrow common
law experimental use exception, the common law exception likely survives
the Hatch-Waxman Act, although its application remains strictly limited to
activities with no commercial purpose.94
In summary, there are two types of experimental use provisions in the
United States. First, the narrow common law experimental use exception
permits experimental uses of any patented invention, as long as it is merely
to satisfy intellectual curiosity and has no commercial purpose.95 Second,
§ 271(e)(1) allows manufacturers to experiment with patented
pharmaceutical and medical inventions, as long as the use is "reasonably
96
related" to obtaining FDA approval. Many activities relating to
commercialization of a drug have been permitted, as § 271(e)(1) has been
interpreted broadly. Finally, these two experimental use exceptions coexist
in the United States.
III. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION IN JAPAN
The experimental use exception in Japan is contained in § 69(1) of the
Japanese Patent Law, which provides that "the effects of the patent right
shall not extend to the working of the patent right for the purposes of
experiment or research. 9 7  Enacted in 1909, while Japan was still a
developing country and net importer of intellectual property, this exception
98
was introduced to spur industrial growth through reverse engineering.
Furthermore, the policy underlying the Japanese experimental use exception
is to promote the development of new technologies. 99  The Japanese
Supreme Court recently held that the experimental use of a patented drug to
generate data for regulatory approval of a generic drug is permitted under
94 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
95 See discussion supra Part H.A.
96 See discussion supra Part ll.B.
97 Tokkyoho [Patent L.], Law No. 121 of Apr. 13, 1959 (Japan), amended by Law No. 24 of Apr. 17,
2002 (Japan), art. 67(2), translated in JAPANESE LAWS RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (Japanese
Patent Office trans., 1996) [hereinafter Patent L.].
98 Katsuya Tamai, Remarks at Center for Advanced Research on Intellectual Property High
Technology Summit (July 20, 2001) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Tamai Remarks]; Reverse
engineering refers to the process of analyzing the components of an invention and how they interact in
order to recreate or modify it.
99 Keiji Kondo, Clinical Testing Falls into Permissible R & D Exception of Patent Infringement, 26
AIPPI JOURNAL 290, 291 (Sept. 2001).
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§ 69(1).100 In contrast to the statutory experimental use exception in the
United States, the Japanese statutory exception applies to all inventions and
is not limited to drugs, medical devices, and similar products.0 1
A. Japanese Pioneer and Generic Drug Approval Process
Under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law ("PAL"), the Ministry of
Health, Welfare and Labor must approve both new and generic drugs before
their commercial production and sale. 102 The PAL is similar to the FDCA,
in that the requirements for obtaining approval for new and generic drugs
differ.1 0 3 For a new drug to be approved, the applicant must demonstrate its
safety and efficacy, usually through clinical trial data.' 04 However, approval
of generic drugs does not require that the drug is proven safe and
effective. 10 5 Generic drug approval requires only that the generic drug is a
biological equivalent to the pioneer drug, that the drug is stable and that the
generic drug's chemical and physical properties are certified." 6 Unlike the
FDCA, the Japanese PAL does not contain a specific set of remedies for the
pioneer drug manufacturer.0 7
Japanese Patent Law § 67(2) includes a patent term extension
provision similar to that in the Hatch-Waxman Act. '08 This section permits
patent term extension for a period of up to five years because of the
necessity of obtaining regulatory approval. 09
B. Conflicting Case Law Relating to the Experimental Use Exception in
Japan
Japan's status as a civil law country implies that judges are limited to
interpreting codes and that judicial decisions have little precedential value." 0
1oo See discussion infra Part III.C.
01 Patent L., supra note 97, art. 69(1).
02 Kondo, supra note 99, at 290-91.
103 Id.
4 Id. at 291.
105 Id.
106 id.
107 Yakuji-Ho [Pharmaceutical Affairs Law], No. 145 of 1960 (Japan), amended by Law No. 96 of
Jul. 31, 2002 (Japan), translated in 8 EHS LAW BULLETIN Series XA (Einbun-Horei-Sha, Inc., ed. 2001).
:o8 Patent L., supra note 97.
09 Id. art. 67(2).
1'0 William T. Christiansen II, Note, Patent Term Extension of Pharmaceuticals in Japan: So You Say
You Want to Rush that Generic Drug to Market in Japan .... Good Luck!, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 613,
637 (1997).
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Analysis of Japanese case law, however, is an integral part of understanding
Japanese law since the courts play a crucial role in law making, through their
interpretation of Japanese statutes. I11 Commentators suggest that case law
analysis is a critical step in understanding Japanese law because case law
precedent is de facto law in Japan and because of prominent judicial
activism in the country. i2 As one scholar comments, "one cannot tell how a
case in contract or tort will be decided by the court if one merely looks at the
text of the Civil Code without reference to precedent."'" 3  Therefore, a
discussion of Japanese case law relating to the experimental use exception
provides insight into the policy considerations motivating Japanese courts
and illustrates how courts may resolve cases based on different facts.
Japanese case law relating to the experimental use exception in
§ 69(1) began with the Tokyo District Court's 1987 decision in Monsanto v.
Stoffer Japan K.K. 14 Monsanto, the owner of a patented herbicide, filed an
infringement action against Stoffer Japan.' 15 Stoffer Japan admitted to using
Monsanto's patented herbicide in experiments required for obtaining
government approval for their generic version of the herbicide, but argued
that their use was permitted under the Japanese experimental use exception
in § 69(1). The Tokyo District Court held that Stoffer Japan's use did not
fall under the Japanese experimental use exception," 6 and therefore, Stoffer
Japan infringed Monsanto's patent. 17 The court stated that "[a]grochemical
experiments carried out for the purpose of securing government registration
of the herbicide are not intended to advance technology and therefore do not
fall within the scope of the 'experiment or research' exception to an
otherwise infringing use." 18  The court focused its interpretation on the
legislative intent behind § 69(1), reasoning that the Japanese experimental
use exception protects only research or experiments that advance
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, 143 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976) [hereinafter JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM].
112 Christiansen, supra note 110, at 638.
3 JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 111.
14 Kondo, supra note 99, at 291; John A. Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune-Pharmaceutical
Experimental Use and Patent Infringement in Japan, 4 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 25-26 (citing Monsanto
Co. v. Stoffer Japan K.K). The abbreviation "K.K." stands for "Kabushiki Kaisha" and means
"Incorporated." E-mail correspondence from Rob Britt, University of Washington, to Jennifer Johnson,
Comment Author, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal (Jan. 29, 2003) (on file with author).
:I5 Kondo, supra note 99, at 291-92.
16 Tessensohn, supra note 114, at 25-26 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Stoffer Japan K.K).
1I1 See id.
..8 Christopher Heath, The Patent Exemption for "Experimental Use" in Clinical Trials: Germany,
Japan, and the U.S. Compared, 22 AIPPI JOURNAL 267, 270 (Nov. 1997).
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technology. 19 The court reasoned that experiments for obtaining regulatory
approval are solely commercial in character, do not advance science, and
thus do not fall within the § 69(1) experimental use exception. 2  Despite
the Monsanto decision, many Japanese generic drug manufacturers assumed
they were allowed to begin clinical testing of the generic drug two to three
years before the expiration of the pioneer drug patent term,'12 ' as long as they
did not market the drug while the patent was still in force.'
22
In 1996, five cases decided in the Nagoya High Court and Nagoya
District Court, referred to as the Synthelabo cases, confirmed the Monsanto
opinion prohibiting use of a patented substance to obtain data for regulatory
approval.1 23  Synthelabo, a French pharmaceutical company, owned two
patents on drugs used to treat brain arteriosclerosis and Parkinson's
disease.124  Operating under the assumption that § 69(1) exempted their
activities from infringement actions, several major Japanese generic drug
manufacturers began clinical testing.1 25  Synthelabo brought patent
infringement actions against the generic drug manufacturers. 126 Following
the rationale in Monsanto, the courts claimed that § 69(1) did not apply to
experiments to gain regulatory approval because the uses were commercial
and did not advance technology.' 2  Hence, the generic drug manufacturer's
activities constituted infringement.128  The courts issued provisional
injunctive orders to prevent the generic drug manufacturers from using the
patented drug during its patent term.' 29 Synthelabo's success encouraged
other pioneer drug companies to initiate actions against generic drug
manufacturers and caused a flood of litigation in the late 1990s focusing on
the § 69(1) experimental use exception.
"9 David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L.
615, 652-53 (1994).
120 Tessensohn, supra note 114, at 26.
1 Id. at 27.
122 Heath, supra note 118, at 274.
123 Tessensohn, supra note 114, at 26 (reporting on the five Synthelabo cases: Synthelabo S.A. v.
Toyo Pharrna K.K. & Yoshindo K.K., Synthelabo S.A. v. Daito K.K. & Nihon Pharmaceutical K.K.,
Synthelabo S.A. v. Horita Pharmaceutical Synthesis K.K., Synthelabo S.A. v. Malco Pharmaceutical K.K.,
and Synthelabo S.A. v. Taiyo Pharmaceutical K.K.).
124 Heath, supra note 118, at 274 (reporting on the Synthelabo decisions).
25 id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 275.
12' Id. at 274-75.
129 Kondo, supra note 99, at 292 (reporting on the Synthelabo decisions).
130 Christopher Heath, Japan: Patent Act, Secs. 69(1), 100(1)-"Synthelabo", 28 IIC 398, 398-399
(1997) (reporting on Synthelabo v. Taiyo Yakuhin).
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Just one year later, generic drug manufacturers finally prevailed,
benefiting from a change in policy regarding experimental use as articulated
in Ono Pharmaceutical K.K. v. Kaigai Pharmaceutical K.K.13 ' Ono
Pharmaceuticals sued seven generic drug manufacturers for producing and
importing generic versions of their patented drug. 132 Once again, a generic
drug manufacturer claimed that its use of the patented drug to obtain
regulatory approval was permitted under § 69(l). 133 In a dramatic shift from
its position in Monsanto, the Tokyo District Court dismissed the case based
on § 67(1) of Japanese Patent Law that limits a patent term to twenty years
after the filing date of the application. 34 The court allowed the generic drug
company's use of the patented drug because prohibiting experimental use to
gather data for regulatory approval would artificially extend the patent term
articulated in § 67(1).135 Although the rationale of the Ono Pharmaceutical
decision was not based on the statutory experimental use exception in
§ 69(1), the Tokyo District Court began a trend of permitting experimental
uses to gain regulatory approval. 
136
Throughout 1997 and 1998, at least seven Japanese high court and
district court decisions permitted generic drug testing of a patented drug to
obtain data for regulatory approval under the experimental use exception in
§ 69(1). 137 In one case, Otsuka PharmaceuticalK.K. v. Towa Yakuhin K.K.,
the Tokyo District Court held that a generic company's use of a patented
bronchodilator for clinical trials was not infringement. 138 The court again
retreated from its earlier position in Monsanto that a generic formulation is
not a scientific advancement and even questioned whether a scientific
advancement or improvement was required for a use to fall within the scope
of the § 69(1) experimental use exception. 139 The court suggested that even
if the advancement requirement applied, generic drugs enhance medical




'34 Id. at 5-6.
13' Id. at 6.
136 See discussion infra Parts III.B & C.
137 Christopher Heath, Japan: Patent Act, Sec. 69-"Procaterole", 30 IC 454, 455 (1999)
(translating a portion of the Tokyo High Court's decision in Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Towa
Yakuhin K.K.).
138 Jinzo Fujino, Latest Developments in Japanese IP Cases: Otsuka Pharnaceutical Co., Ltd. v.
Towa Yakuhin K.K., 22 AIPPI JOURNAL 296 (Nov. 1997) (reporting on Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v.
Towa Yakuhin K.K.).
1 39 Heath, supra note 118, at 276 (reporting on Tokyo District Court's decision in Otsuka
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Towa Yakuhin K.K.).
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technology. 14  In addition, clinical trials during the pioneer drug's patent
term did not interfere with Patent Law's goal of granting exclusive
commercial use for the entire duration of the patent.' 41  Prohibiting
experimentation for obtaining regulatory approval under § 69(1) would have
the undesirable effect of artificially lengthening the pioneer drug's patent
term and thereby conflicted with the purpose of the Patent Law.' 42 The
Tokyo High Court affirmed and held that testing to determine whether a
generic drug is a bioequivalent of a patented drug is a technological
advancement, allowing it to fall under the § 69(1) experimental use
exception. 1
43
The Japanese courts, however, inconsistently interpreted the § 69(1)
experimental use exception with respect to the technical advancement
requirement. Some courts interpreted § 69(1) to lack the technological
advancement requirement, while others held that the advancement
requirement was maintained and a generic formulation represented such an
advancement. In Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v. Sawai Pharmaceutical K.K.,
the Tokyo District Court allowed Sawai's testing of a generic drug for
regulatory approval since, similar to the position taken by the Tokyo High
Court in Otsuka, a generic drug was technical progress and thus within the
scope of § 69(1). 144 Two months later, in Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
v. Shiono Chemical K.K. & Choseido Pharmaceutical K.K., the Tokyo
District Court articulated that "experiment or research" under § 69(1) is not
subject to the requirement that the experiment advance technology. 45
Although the distinction does not change the ultimate result of including
experiments for generic drug approval under the § 69(1) umbrella, this
distinction may prove important when interpreting § 69(1) outside the
pharmaceutical context.
Just as generic drug companies began to feel comfortable testing their
products during the pioneer drug's patent term, the Nagoya District Court
resurrected the old hard-line position that clinical testing for market approval
140 id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 276-277.
14 Tessensohn, supra note 114, at 66 n.234 (reporting on Tokyo High Court's decision in Otsuka
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Towa Yakuhin K.K.); Heath, supra note 137, at 456.
144 Tessensohn, supra note 114, at 6-7 (citing Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v. Sawai Pharmaceutical
K.K.).
14 Id. at 10, 14 (citing Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Shiono Chemical K.K. & Choseido
Pharmaceutical K.K).
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infringed the pioneer drug's patent. 146 Although the court found that the
pioneer drug patent was infringed, the court granted only monetary damages
and refused to grant the important remedy of injunctive relief. 147 This weak
damage award diminished the victory for big pharmaceutical companies and
therefore did not completely return the playing field to its status immediately
after Monsanto.
48
C. The Japanese Supreme Court Allows Testing for Regulatory Approval
Under the Experimental Use Exception in § 69(1)
The Japanese Supreme Court's unanimous 1999 decision in Ono
Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd. v. Kyoto Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.
confirmed that tests during a patent term to obtain data required for
regulatory approval are not infringing activities under § 69(1).149  Ono
Pharmaceuticals brought an infringement action against Kyoto
Pharmaceuticals after learning that Kyoto Pharmaceuticals carried out
experiments during the pioneer drug's patent term to obtain regulatory
approval for its generic version.' 50 Even though the original patent expired
prior to this decision, Ono Pharmaceuticals sought to prevent Kyoto
Pharmaceuticals from selling the generic drug for two and a half years to
compensate Ono for part of its patent term lost by Kyoto Pharmaceutical's
activities. 1 In 1997, the Kyoto District Court, not considering whether
§ 69(1) applied in this situation, decided the case on the grounds that an
injunction cannot be enforced after a patent expires. 52
On appeal to the Osaka High Court, Ono requested monetary damages
as compensation for two and a half years of infringement. 53 The Osaka
High Court found for Kyoto Pharmaceuticals based on the § 69(1)
146 Soichi Okuyama, Latest Developments in Japanese IP Cases: Ono Pharmeceuticals Co., Ltd. v.
Kyoto Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., 24 AIPPI JOURNAL, 106, 108 (May 1999).
:47 Tessensohn, supra note 114, at 41.
148 Id.
149 Okuyama, supra note 146, at 108 (citing Ono Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd. v. Kyoto Pharmaceutical
Industries, Ltd.); Christopher Heath, Japan. Patent Act, Sec. 69-"Clinical Trials Ill", 30 IIC 448, 449
(citing Ono Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd. v. Kyoto Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.).
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experimental use exception and did not consider the remaining issues. 54
Ono Pharmaceuticals appealed to the Japanese Supreme Court.
55
In finding for Kyoto Pharmaceuticals on the grounds that § 69(1)
allowed experimental use of a patented drug for obtaining regulatory
approval, the Japanese Supreme Court focused on the policies behind the
Patent Law.' 56  The Court aimed to prevent the artificial extension of a
pioneer drug's patent term during the two to three years required for the
generic drug to gain approval from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and
Labor. 57 The Court stated "it is one of the basic principles of the patent
system to allow anyone to exploit freely a new technology after the expiry of
the patent term, thereby generating a benefit to society."'
158
Since the Japanese Supreme Court did not mention technological
advancement,' 59 it remains unclear whether the Court maintained the
advancement requirement for the experimental use exception, finding that
the creation of a generic drug was a technological advancement, or whether
the Court eliminated the advancement requirement altogether. i60 Japanese
patent law scholars have taken different positions on this issue. A law clerk
for the Japanese Supreme Court commented that the absence of discussion
on the advancement requirement implies that the Court abandoned the
technological advancement requirement for § 69(1). 161 An opposing
position advanced by another scholar, however, is that the technical
advancement requirement remains and a generic drug manufacturer's
experiments are an advance because "the manufacturing process of [the]
active ingredient and the composition of inactive ingredients are not
disclosed."'162 The Japanese Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify its
"s Id. at 109.
155 Id.
156 Heath, supra note 149, at 448 (citing Ono Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd. v. Kyoto Pharmaceutical
Industries, Ltd.).
Is d.158 id.
:59 Kondo, supra note 99, at 293.
61 Interview with Mr. Noriyuki Inoue, Japanese Patent Examiner, University of Washington, in
Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 30, 2003).
161 Maiko Takabe, 1162 JURIsTo 133, 133-35 (Nov. 1, 1999), synopsis of Japanese source based upon
E-mail correspondence from Noriyuki Inoue, to Jennifer Johnson, Comment Author, Pacific Rim Law and
Policy Journal (Jan. 29, 2003) (on file with the author).
162 Shoji Matsui, 45 AIPPI JOURNAL 87 (2000) partial translation of Japanese source based upon E-
mail correspondence from Toshiko Takenaka, University of Washington, to Jennifer Johnson, Comment
Author, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal (Jan. 31, 2003) (on file with the author).
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position when Otsuka Pharmaceutical was appealed to the Court, but the
Court did not grant the appeal.
163
The logical approach seems to support retaining the advancement
requirement. First, keeping the advancement requirement for experimental
use furthers the goal of the Patent Law to promote technological
development. Second, if the advancement requirement is not maintained,
the incentives for inventing may be decreased as competitors can get away
with more uses of a patented invention, such as testing the commercial value
of a patented invention.
The Japanese Supreme Court did set limits on the § 69(1)
experimental use exception's application to pharmaceuticals, noting:
it is an act of infringement and impermissible, for a third party
to manufacture generic drugs during the patent term to be
assigned after the expiration of the patent or to make or use [the
drug] beyond the extent that is necessary for experiments to be
carried out in order to file under § 14 of the Pharmaceutical
Affairs Law.' 
64
As a result of the Japanese Supreme Court's Ono decision, the general
statutory experimental use exception in § 69(1) allows generic drug
manufacturers to experiment with a patented drug to get regulatory
approval.165 The decision ended years of confusion over whether § 69(1)
allowed such experimentation. 166 However, it is still unclear whether an
experimental use must be an advancement in science to fall under § 69(1).167
D. The Japanese Experimental Use Exception is Broader than the U.S.
Experimental Use Exception.
The Japanese experimental use provision in § 69(1) is much broader
than both the U.S. common law and § 271 (e)(1) experimental use exceptions
combined. The § 271(e)(1) experimental use exception is a pharmaceutical-
163 John Tessensohn, Patents: Infringement-experimental use exempted for clinical trials, 21
EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVIEW N-140 (1999) (reporting on Ono Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd.
v. Kyoto Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.).
'6 Okuyama, supra note 146, at 112.
I6 d. at 106.
166 See discussion supra Part III.B.
167 Interview with Mr. Noriyuki Inoue, Japanese Patent Examiner, University of Washington, in
Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 30, 2003).
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specific exception that allows generic drug manufacturers to use a patented
pioneer drug to obtain data required for regulatory approval. ' Although the
common law experimental use exception applies to all inventions, the scope
of experimental use in the United States is effectively limited to the
pharmaceutical industry because the common law exception is limited to the
rare instances where a patented invention is used with no commercial
purpose. 1
6 9
In contrast, the Japanese statutory experimental use exception in
§ 69(1) applies to all inventions and is not expressly limited to
experimentation in the context of generic drug testing. 7 ° The Japanese
experimental use exception, however, is also not limited to inventions that
require government approval. 17 1 As a result of the Japanese Supreme Court
decision in Ono Pharmaceuticals, § 69(1) covers either: (1) experiments that
result in an advancement in technology or (2) all experiments and research,
including those that do not advance technology.1 72 This requirement may
not be difficult to satisfy, as making a generic drug formulation of a patented
drug is not a monumental scientific accomplishment. Arguably, as long as
an experiment is within the broad definition of an advancement in
technology, it will fall within the scope of § 69(1). This breadth of the
Japanese experimental use exception should permit many beneficial
experimental uses such as investigating the patentability of an invention,
analyzing the function of an invention, and developing and improving on an
invention.
73
IV. CRITIcisMS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Three major criticisms of the U.S. experimental use exceptions have
emerged. First, the common law experimental use exception prevents
inventors from advancing technology by prohibiting inventors from using a
patented invention to improve on it, also known as "designing around" it.
Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act paired the experimental use exception in
'" See discussion supra Parts II & III.
169 Mueller, supra note 83, at 24.
170 Patent L., supra note 97, art. 69(1).
" Id. art. 69(1).
72 See discussion supra Part III.C.
173 NoBUHtRo NAKAYAMA, CHUKAI TOKKYOHO (ANNOTATED PATENT LAW) 675, 679 (3d. ed. 2000),
partial translation based on E-mail correspondence from Toshiko Takenaka, University of Washington, to
Jennifer Johnson, Comment Author, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal (Jan. 30, 2003) (on file with
author). The effects on promoting research by allowing these uses are discussed at infra Part V.A.
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§ 271(e)(1) with powerful remedies for pioneer drug manufacturers that
have been abused to prevent the timely entry of generic drugs into the
market. These two problems may be ameliorated if the United States adopts
a general statutory experimental use exception. Finally, there is concern that
the absence of a general statutory experimental research exception will have
a stifling effect on university research. This concern has not been realized,
however, as evidenced by the increase in inventive activities at universities.
A. Preventing the Advancement of the State of the Art by Designing
Around a Patent
One criticism of the common law experimental use exception in the
United States is that it does not permit advancing the state of the art by
trying to design around a patent. 74 The Federal Circuit discussed this issue
in Embrex v. Service Engineering.1 75 Embrex exclusively licensed a patent
for a method of inoculating chicks against diseases by injecting a vaccine
into a specific region of the egg before hatching.1 76 Embrex brought an
infringement action against Service Engineering for attempting to achieve
immunity by injecting a different part of the egg with vaccine that was not
covered by the Embrex patent. 177 The tests were not successful in inducing
immunity.178 Furthermore, most injections accidentally penetrated the area
covered by the Embrex patent. 179 After recognizing a narrow common law
experimental use exception, the Federal Circuit stated that the Service
Engineering consultant's acts infringed the Embrex patent because the test
could not be deemed an experimental use.180 The court commented that
"while SEC tries to cloak these tests in the guise of scientific inquiry, that
alone cannot immunize its acts."18 1 This case illustrates the current situation
in the United States, that experiments to design around an existing patent are
not protected by the common law experimental use exception.I2
In contrast, the general statutory experimental use exception in Japan
permits the use of a patented invention to design around a patent."' 3 The
174 Mueller, supra note 83, at 29.
75 Embrex, Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
176 Id. at 1346.
177 Id.
171 Id. at 1347.
179 Id.
"0 Id. at 1349.
181 Id.
:82 Mueller, supra note 83, at 29.
83 NAKAYAMA, supra note 173, at 679.
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Japanese experimental use provision is more clearly directed towards the
policy goals of encouraging development of industry and encouraging
scientific progress. 84  Permitting this type of experimental use allows
Japanese researchers to use patented inventions to improve upon them, while
in the United States this type of research amounts to infringement' 85 and
stifles scientific advancement. Therefore, unlike the common law
experimental use exception in the United States, the Japanese experimental
use exception permits use of a patented invention to design around it for
scientific advancement.
B. U.S. Law Creates Incentives to Delay Generic Drug Market Approval
Perhaps the most significant criticism of the statutory experimental
use exception in the United States is that it was enacted as part of a package
that combines the experimental use exception in § 271 (e)(1) with powerful
remedies that pioneer drug manufacturers have used to delay the entry of
generic drugs. 186  The Hatch-Waxman Act allows a pioneer drug
manufacturer to delay approval of a generic drug ANDA for forty-five days
while the pioneer drug company decides whether or not to bring an
infringement action against the generic drug manufacturer.' 8 7 Furthermore,
if the pioneer drug manufacturer does file suit, the generic drug's approval is
delayed for either thirty months or until the conclusion of the suit.' is
Considering that a blockbuster drug such as Prozac® generates U.S.
sales of approximately $4.75 million U.S. dollars per day, pioneer drug
manufacturers have a huge incentive to delay generic drug approval by days,
weeks or months, even if it means initiating litigation.189 This practice was
the focus of a recent Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") investigation and
prompted President Bush to propose regulations that would limit the ability
of pioneer drug companies to delay the market entry of generic drugs. 190 A
FTC study found that pioneer drug companies routinely file frivolous
lawsuits to intentionally delay cheaper generic drugs from obtaining FDA
approval.' 91 The report also states that pioneer drug manufacturers can
184 Tamai Remarks, supra note 98.
"tS Embrex. Inc., 216 F.3d at 1343.
186 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see discussion supra Part I.
:7 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); see discussion supra Part n.C.
8 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
89 William Christiansen, Remarks at Center for Advanced Study and Research on Intellectual
Property High Technology Summit (July 20, 2001) (transcript on file with author).
:90 Bush Proposes Rules, supra note 1.
191 Id.
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effectively delay generic drug approval for many years by repeatedly
invoking the thirty-month stay provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act.192 The
Bush proposal allows a pioneer drug manufacturer only one thirty-month
stay of a generic drug's ANDA and limits the other strategies that pioneer
drug manufacturers have been known to rely on to extend their patent
monopolies. 93  Bush did recognize, however, that pioneer drug
manufacturers need strong patent protection during their legitimate patent
term, because the development of a pioneer drug can cost upwards of US
$800 million.'
94
By contrast, in Japan, pioneer drug manufacturers are unable to
artificially extend their patent terms under provisions related to the
experimental use exception in § 69(1). After the Japanese Supreme Court
decision in Ono Pharmaceuticals, it is clear that generic drug manufacturers
can use a patented drug to obtain the data required for regulatory
approval. 95 If a pioneer drug manufacturer believes that the generic drug
manufacturer is otherwise infringing its patent, the sole remedy for the
pioneer drug manufacturer is to bring an infringement suit under § 68 of the
Japanese Patent Law. Section 68 provides that "a patentee shall have an
exclusive right to commercially work the patented invention.' 96 The PAL
does not provide any additional remedies for pioneer drug manufacturers
who believe that their patents are being infringed by the generic drug
manufacturer.' 97 This same remedy is provided for all patent infringement
suits and does not provide any special treatment for the pharmaceutical
industry.
C. Does the Limited U.S. Experimental Use Exception Have a Chilling
Effect on University Research?
One prominent criticism of the experimental use exception in the
United States is that the absence of a general statutory experimental use
exception, like that of Japan, has a chilling effect on basic research at




195 See Okuyama, supra note 146, at 106.
1 Patent L., supra note 97, art. 68.
197 Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, supra note 107.
"s Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1989).
VOL. 12 No. 2
MARCH 2003 U S. AND JAPANESE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTIONS
only addresses the pharmaceutical industry, university researchers must rely
on the common law experimental use exception to exempt university
research activities from infringing existing patents. The common law
exception has been interpreted narrowly and excludes uses with a
commercial purpose.' 99 Therefore, university researchers cannot rely on the
common law experimental use exception to exempt their research activities
from infringing a patent, especially when industry collaborations are
common and legislation has encouraged the commercialization of university
research.2°0  In fact, the Federal Circuit recently declined to apply the
common law experimental use exception to a university since its research
activities "unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business
objectives, including educating and enlightening students and faculty
participating in these projects. ' 20 1 Without a broad experimental use
exception, one commentator has argued that royalties and heightened
transaction costs threaten to slow the progress of basic research at
universities. °2
An analysis of patent and research statistics, two measures of
academic research activity, does not support the hypothesis that the narrow
common law experimental use exception has stifled university research. A
recent National Science Foundation study illustrated that from 1979 to 2000
the percentage of university patents as a percentage of total utility patents
has steadily increased.. Academic patents constitute almost five percent of
all new U.S. patents, up from less than half a percent just twenty years
ago. Additionally, the number of academic institutions receiving patents
increased from about 300 in the 1970s to 3151 in 1998.205 The same study
also found that since 1953, the average annual growth of academic research
and development has been stronger than for any other research and
development sector. 20 6 Finally, academia performs forty-three percent of
'99 See discussion supra Parts II.A & E.200 Patricia C. Kuszler, Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Impossible Dreams and
Ilarsh Realities, 8 WIDENER. L. S)mp. J. 115, 123-27 (2001) (discussing the cffects of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Act and the Bayh-Doyle Act).201 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F. 3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).202 Mueller, supra note 83, at 1.
201 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, US. Colleges and Universities-Utility Patent Grants, CalendarYears 1969-2000, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/asgitable_l.htm (last visited Jan.
28, 2003).
204 National Science Foundation, Academic Research and Development: Outputs of Scientific and
Engineering Research: Articles and Patents, http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seindO2/c5/c5s3 (last visited Jan.
28, 2003) [hereinafter National Science Foundation Study].205 id.
206 id.
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basic research and is the largest performer of basic research in U.S. 20 7 These
statistics make it difficult to believe that university research has suffered
from a narrow common law experimental use exception.
In summary, two criticisms of the U.S. experimental use exceptions
are persuasive. First, prohibiting experimental use of a patented invention
may slow some beneficial advances, such as finding a new use for an
already patented drug in the absence of a license. Second, the Hatch-
Waxman Act has been a powerful tool to delay the market entry of generic
drugs. However, the criticism that university research is stifled by a narrow
common law experimental use exception may not be valid as universities are
increasingly active contributors to basic research.
V. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND PATENT
HARMONIZATION
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement
("TRIPS"), signed by both the United States and Japan, sets forth minimum
patent rights and protections. Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement provides
general standards relating to exceptions of exclusive rights. The
experimental use exceptions in both the United States and Japan appear to
comply literally with the vague standards in Article 30. Upon closer
examination, however, the general statutory experimental use provision in
Japan is consistent with the experimental use provisions of the rest of the
world, while the U.S. experimental use provisions are not. Therefore, the
United States provisions do not further patent harmonization.
A. The TRIPS Agreement's Approach to Experimental Use
In 1947, twenty-three countries signed the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade ("GATT") to stimulate the world economy by promoting. .. . 208 AT
access to protectionist markets and increasing international trade. GATT
developed over eight rounds, resulting in the 1994 "Uruguay Round" version
that addressed many significant barriers to trade.209 The United States
became a signatory in December 1994, after the U.S. Congress passed, and
207 id.
20' Ned Milenkovich, Deleting the Bolar Amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act: Harmonizing
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in a Global Village, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 756-57 (1999).
209 Id.
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President Clinton signed, the GATT agreement.21 ° Japan is also a signatory
to the GATT agreement.
21
'
The GATT agreement includes a section that addresses global
intellectual property rights and protections, designated TRIPS. 212 Section
five of TRIPS, which includes Articles 27 to 34, specifically addresses the
patent aspects of GATT and provides minimum patent law standards for
member countries.
2 13
Article 30 of the TRIPS agreement lists liberal conditions for
exceptions to exclusive patent rights. These conditions include: (1) the
exceptions must be limited; (2) exceptions should not unreasonably conflict
with the normal exploitation of the patent; and (3) exceptions should not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of third parties. 2 15  This
provision does not provide much guidance and allows national governments
significant freedom to define the scope of exceptions to exclusive patent
rights.2 16 In fact, one commentator has suggested that the vague language of
Article 30 illustrates the difficulties that the negotiating parties experienced
in agreeing on the nature and extent of exceptions to exclusive patent
rights.2 17 Although the scope of Article 30 is unclear, the same commentator
suggested that based on comparative law and other proposals the following
uses are likely permitted under Article 30: acts done privately with a non-
commercial purpose; uses for research; experimentation with the invention
to verify its function or to improve on it; and experiments made for the
purpose of acquiring regulatory approval for marketing a product after the
expiration of the invention.
218
210 Id.
21 See Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights, 1992 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 81 (1992).212 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
213 Id. arts. 27-43.
214 Id. art. 30.
215 Id.
216 CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 208 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusef eds., 1998).
217 Carlos Correa, The GA TT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights:
New Standards for Patent Protection, 16 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 327, 330-333 (1994), reprinted in
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 379 (2001).
218 CORREA, supra note 216.
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B. Both the United States and Japan Literally Comply with Article 30
Under the vague language of Article 30, the statutory experimental
use exception in the United States appears to comply with TRIPS. First,
permitting experimental use of a patented drug while obtaining data for
regulatory approval under § 271(e)(l) in the United States is indeed a very
limited exception, as it addresses a specific industry during a finite
regulatory approval process. 219  Second, the statute requires that these
experimental uses by generic drug manufacturers do not unreasonably
conflict with the patent holder's exclusive right because generic drug
manufacturers can only enter the market once the patent holders rights have
expired or are invalidated. 220 Finally, § 271(e)(1) also ensures that the
legitimate interests of third parties are not unreasonably prejudiced by
allowing generic drug manufacturers to experiment with a pioneer drug for
uses reasonably related to obtaining FDA approval. 221 The public is not
prejudiced because cheaper generic drugs can enter the marketplace
immediately after the pioneer drug patent expires or is invalidated. 222 The
common law experimental use exception also appears to comply with TRIPS
using a similar analysis.
Assuming that the Japanese experimental use exception is limited to
experimental uses that are advancements in technology, the Japanese
exception set forth in § 69(1) also complies with TRIPS Article 30. This
limitation ensures that the original patent holder's rights are not diminished
as the benefits from the original patent still flow to the patent owner. Only
advancements beyond the scope of the original patented invention are
protected under § 69(1). In addition, this broader exception protects the
legitimate interests of third parties allowing inventors and the public to
benefit from experimental advances-a new use of a patented drug, for
example. If the Japanese Supreme Court eliminated the advancement
requirement for experimental use, the analysis under Article 30 is more
problematic since the use is less limited and more likely to interfere with the
normal exploitation of the patent. Arguably, this interpretation of § 69(1)
may still comply with the vague language of Article 30.
219 See discussion supra Parts II.C & IV.
220 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B).
221 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); see discussion supra Parts II.C & D.
222 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(13).
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C. Although the United States Approach Literally Complies With TRIPS,
It Does Not Further Patent Harmonization
Even though both the experimental use exception in the United States
and Japan comply literally with TRIPS, the exception in the United States
runs counter to the underlying policy of patent harmonization behind the
TRIPS agreement. The main goal of patent harmonization is to create
efficiency and certainty regarding the patent laws of the world. 223 TRIPS
was just one of many attempts at harmonizing global intellectual property
laws.224 While the U.S. experimental use exceptions are very narrow, a
broad experimental use exception is generally recognized outside the United
States. 225 The narrow U.S. experimental use provisions are not the paradigm
in other nations. The patent laws of Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Korea, the European Patent Convention and other countries contain broad
statutory experimental use exceptions. 226 Furthermore, other countries do
not have provisions like the Hatch-Waxman Act that provide additional
227
remedies for pioneer drug manufacturers. In this respect, when viewed in
the context of international patent law, the Hatch-Waxman Act "really
stands out like a sore thumb., 228 Although the United States may literally
comply with TRIPS, it may wish to harmonize its experimental use
provisions by adopting a general experimental use exception.
The Japanese experimental use exception is more consistent with the
broad experimental use provisions in other countries.229 Therefore, Japan's
approach furthers the goal of harmonizing the patent laws of the world. In
an effort to harmonize global patent law, the United States should adopt the
Japanese approach. This would entail replacing the common law
experimental use exception and the pharmaceutical specific experimental
use exception in § 271(e)(1) with a general statutory experimental use
exception.
2'3 Faryan Andrew Afifi, Note, Unifying Internatioral Paent Protection: The Werld Intelectual
Property Organization Must Coordinate Regional Patent Systems, 15 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 453,
460-62 (1993).
224 Daphne Yong-d'Herv6, Pre-TRIPS International Legal Framework, TRIPS Structure, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 8, 8-10 (ICC Publishing S.A. 1996).
225 Mueller, supra note 83, at 37.
226 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 685, 718
(2002 :7 Thomas Borecki, Remarks at Center for Advanced Research on Intellectual Property High
Technology Summit (July 20, 2001) (transcript on file with author).
228 id.
229 Duffy, supra note 226, at 718.
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VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Both legislative and judicial efforts have been made in the United
States to solve the problems associated with the U.S. experimental use
approach. During the past fifteen years, the legislature has considered two
types of experimental use provisions: (1) a broad statutory experimental use
provision; and (2) several industry-specific experimental use provisions that
would permit experimental use in certain fields of research. None of the
proposed legislative solutions have been successful. One court, however,
has advanced a judicial solution to allowing a beneficial experimental use by
interpreting the § 271(e)(1) experimental use provision extremely broadly.
Since the United States has generally been unsuccessful in solving the
problems associated with experimental use, the United States should again
consider solutions that would bring it closer to the Japanese model.
Limiting patent rights by allowing more experimental uses should not
discourage inventive activity.
A. Proposed Legislation to Bring the United States Closer to the
Japanese Model
Several attempts have been made to enact different versions of an
experimental use exception in the United States. In 1988, Congress
considered adding a limited experimental use exception in a bill that would
permit the patenting of transgenic animals.2 30 The Judiciary Committee
stated that a research exemption already existed in case law and was not
necessary in the bill, and subsequently removed the experimental use
exception for transgenic animals from the bill. 231 However, the House
Report suggested that "Congress should, at some future point, amend Title
35 to provide that use of a patented invention or process is not an act of
infringement if done for the purpose of experimentation or research. 32 This
requirement should not apply only to biotechnology, but should extend to all
patented inventions. 2 33
During hearings regarding the limited experimental use exception
proposed for transgenic animals, many esteemed expert witnesses supported
230 H.R. REP. No. 100-888, at 50 (1988). The term "transgenic animal" refers to animal whose
genome contains genetic material from another source.
'' Id. at 49-51.
.2 Id. at 51.
233 id.
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a general statutory research exemption. Professor Donald Chisum of the
University of Washington School of Law,234 Howard Bremer of the
Association of University Technology Managers 235 and Dr. Stuart Newman
of the Council for Responsible Genetics 236 all expressly supported a broad
statutory experimental use exception. Bremer, in a written statement,
favored a broad research exemption encompassing all technologies rather
than a piecemeal approach for various technologies and special interest
groupS.
23 7
Shortly thereafter, the House Committee proposed the Patent
Competitiveness and Technological Act of 1990.238 Title IV of the act
provided that "the making or using of a patented invention solely for
research or experimentation shall not be an act of patent infringement unless
the patented invention has the primary purpose of research or
experimentation. ' 239 The House Report listed the following activities as
falling under the proposed exemption: testing to determine how an
invention works; testing to determine its sufficiency or compare it to the
prior art; experimenting for the purpose of designing around a patented
invention; experimentation on a patented invention to improve on it; and
testing to determine whether the invention is acceptable for licensing and
240academic experimentation. Importantly, the report recognized that since
Japan and Western Europe already have similar legislation in this area, "it
cannot be strenuously argued that legislation will cause any serious trade
distorting effects. 241 Manufacturing and intellectual property associations
opposed the bill because they were concerned that a broad experimental use
exception would diminish the incentives of the U.S. patent system and
242provide unnecessary protections for universities. Despite the full
Committee's recommendation to the House, the bill was not enacted. 243
A more recent attempt at codifying an experimental use exception was
specifically directed at the biotechnology industry. In March 2002, the
Genetic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002 was introduced
134 Id. at 104. Professor Chisum is currently at the Santa Clara University School of Law.
233 H.R. REP. No. 100-888, at 220 (1988). Howard Bremer is currently at the Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation.
26 id.
23' Id. at 208.
238 H.R. REP. No. 10 1-960, pt. I (1990).
239 Id. at 2.
240 Id. at 45.
241 Id.
242 H.R. 101-960, at 67-69.
243 H.R. 101-960.
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to address the concern that gene patenting may have a negative effect on
biotechnology research and patient care by prohibiting the use of patented
gene sequences in research and diagnostic testing. 244  The sponsor,
Representative Lynn Rivers, stated that the purpose of the bill is to "broaden
the availability and usefulness of gene-based diagnostics in the overall
health care system, while allowing essential medical progress to continue
unabated., 245 The bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property on May 6, 2002.246 There has been no
action since.247
The Senate recently took a different approach to remedy the problems
with the Hatch-Waxman Act when it passed the Greater Access to
248Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2002 ("GAAP") by a margin of 78-21.
The GAAP proposes major modifications to the Hatch-Waxman Act,
including prohibiting an extension of the thirty-month stay of the provision
under Paragraph IV certification and making a failure to file a civil action
for infringement within forty-five days of notice of a Paragraph IV filing a
249bar to later action. Merck, a pioneer drug company, opposed the GAAP
because it would "upset the delicate balance of Hatch-Waxman" and would
create uncertainty for patent protection. 250 The House has not yet debated
the bill, but a discharge petition has been introduced to force a vote on the
bill.
251
B. Judicial Solutions to Allow Designing Around a Patent Under§ 271(e)(1)
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York recently took an innovative
approach to allow the desirable use of designing around a patent, absent a
244 CONG. REC. E353 (Mar. 14, 2002),
available at http://www.house.gov/sciencedemocrats/member/lr031402.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
245 id.
246 Bill Summary and Status for the 107th Congress,




230 Merck Action Network, U.S. House of Representatives Considering Measure That Would Create
Uncertainty for Patent Protection, at http://www.capitolconnect.com/merck/pp/registrationform.
asp?subject-357 (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
251 Bill Summary and Status for the 107th Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
binibdquery/z?d107:HRO1862:@@@L&sunmn2- n& (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
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general experimental use exception. 252  Rhone-Poulenc Rorer ("RPR")
owned a patent for the process of making a popular anti-cancer drug named
Taxol® and four intermediates used in manufacturing the drug.253 Bristol-
Myers Squibb ("BMS") admitted to using the intermediates in its research
and development program regarding Taxol® analogs, but defended its use
based on the § 271(e)(1) experimental use exception to infringement.254
BMS argued that its use was permitted under § 271(e)(1) because its uses
were reasonably related to the development and submission of information
for submission to the FDA.255 In holding that BMS did not infringe the
patent, the court interpreted § 271(e)(1) activities "reasonably related" to
obtaining FDA approval very broadly, stating "[w]e should ask: would it
have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in defendant's situation to
believe that there was a decent prospect that the 'use' in question would
contribute (relatively directly) to the generation of the kinds of information
that was likely to be relevant in the rocess by which the FDA would decide
whether to approve the product?, 25P BMS did not infringe the RPR patent,
since BMS's research efforts to generate new Taxol® analogs were aimed at
trying to get a drug that could someday be submitted to the FDA. 57 The
court, in dicta, stated that BMS would be protected even if its results were
later abandoned for reasons unrelated to FDA approval.258 This approach is
one solution to allowing the beneficial use of encouraging research and
development by designing around a patent, at least in the context of the
pharmaceutical industry.
C. Following the Japanese Model Should Not Limit Inventive Activity
Expanding the experimental use exceptions in the United States to a
general statutory exception, like § 69(1) in the Japanese Patent Law, may
solve many of the problems discussed above. Although it has been
suggested that expanding the U.S. experimental use exceptions would
252 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 (RPP), 2001 WL
1512597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2001).
253 Id. at * 1.
24 Id. at * 1-2.
255 Id. at *2.
256 Id. at *3.
257 Id. at *5.
25 Id. at *6.
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259discourage invention by reducing patent protection, it is unlikely that
these fears will be realized.
In Japan, where a general statutory experimental use exception has
260been in place for over one hundred years, inventive activity is growing at
an exceptional rate. 26' A Washington, D.C. think tank study created a
National Innovation Index that measured real and projected innovations per
million residents.262 Although the United States ranked number one in this
index in 1995, the study predicted that the United States will rank numbersix on theindex an 263 T-- , ,
six on the index by 2005. In addition, the study predicted that Japan will
lead the world in innovative activity by 2005.264 Furthermore, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office consistently finds that Japanese companies are
as active as U.S. companies in seeking U.S. patents.265  Furthermore,
inventive activity measured by publications in scientific journals has also
increased dramatically.266  Between 1986 and 1999, Japan's output of
267scientific publications grew by nearly fifty percent. Therefore, the broad
experimental use exception in Japan has not stifled inventive activity by
decreasing incentives to obtain patent protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
Japan and the United States approach the experimental use exception
in their respective patent laws very differently. The problems associated
with the U.S. experimental use exceptions, such as preventing beneficial
experimental uses with patented inventions, artificially extending
pharmaceutical patent terms and inhibiting patent harmonization, warrants
consideration of a different approach. One solution to the problems
associated with experimental use in the United States is to adopt an
experimental use exception that permits experiments or research with
patented inventions that advance technology, similar to that of Japan. This
259 Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad
Exception, 100 YALE L. J. 2169, 2180 (1991).
260 Tamai Remarks, supra note 98.
161 MICHAEL E. PORTER & SCOTT STERN, THE NEW CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN'S PROSPERITY:
FINDINGS FROM THE INNOVATION INDEX 7 (1999), http://www.compete.org/pdf/index.pdf (last visited Feb.
17, 2003).
262 Id. at 6.
263 Id. at 34-35.
24 Id. at 35.
161 JULIE L. DAVIS & SUZANNE S. HARRISON, EDISON IN THE BOARDROOM: HOW LEADING
COMPANIES REALIZE VALUE FROM THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS 4 (2001).
266 National Science Foundation Study, supra note 204.
267 Id.
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solution may ameliorate the problems related to experimental use in the
United States without compromising the goals of the patent system.

